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Morgan’s Canon is a specific restating of Occam’s Razor that 
dictates that any description of animal behavior should never 
call upon higher order psychological processes if the behavior 
could, fairly, be explained in terms of lower processes. 
Herein, the Canon is discussed both historically and in light of 
current research into animal behavior. A reconsideration of 
the principle of parsimony, taking into account current states 
of knowledge, is also considered. In short, it is argued that 
Morgan’s Canon, while a useful guideline, may have been 
over-enthusiastically applied in situations where the state of 
knowledge about a species would dictate that descriptions of 
its behavior in terms of higher order processes would be 
equally or more parsimonious. The potential benefits of 
reconsidering the Canon are then discussed. 
Keywords: parsimony; animal behavior; comparative 
psychology; theory of mind; individual differences. 
Morgan’s Canon 
In no case is an animal activity to be interpreted in terms of 
higher psychological processes, if it can be fairly 
interpreted in terms of processes which stand lower in the 
scale of psychological evolution and development. (Morgan, 
1903). 
 
Comparisons between animal and human behaviors have a 
long history, with  scholars as far back as Aristotle 
(340BC/1952) arguing that ‘reason’ divides humans from 
the rest of the animal kingdom. This division, embedded in 
the Christian distinction between the creation and place of 
men and animals, was carried through the writings of such 
philosophers as Descartes (1640/1988) who placed the seat 
of reason in the soul; and little seems to have challenged this 
view until the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species 
(1876/1988). 
The arguments presented by Darwin, regarding the 
common descent of all animals through natural selection 
acting on ancestor populations, broke down the clear-cut 
division between human and animal that had previously 
held sway in Western thought and promoted the idea that, 
across species, one should expect to see variation in traits – 
including such mental attributes as intelligence (Darwin, 
1899/1965). Thus, while humans might be the species 
blessed with the greatest reasoning ability, one would 
expect that other species would have this to a greater or less 
extent – with the further understanding that closely related 
species would, likely, have similar levels of intelligence.  
Romanes (1882), following this parsimonious line of 
reasoning, produced his book Animal Intelligence in which 
he described a great variety of animal behaviors (both 
collected by himself and sent to him by correspondents) in 
terms of the mental states and understanding required to 
produce them. The anecdotal nature of this work, however, 
provoked the responses of Morgan (1903) and Thorndike 
(1911), whose use of observational study of animals 
convinced them that many of the cases of ‘intelligent’ 
behavior reported by Romanes were, in fact, easily 
explained as the result of trial-and-error learning. 
The reaction to Romanes’ book and the subsequent 
research on conditioning by Pavlov (1927) led to a drastic 
change in approach to animal behavior research. Rather than 
considering the pre-existing knowledge of common lineage, 
researchers were, instead, motivated to explain behavior in 
the simplest, possible psychological terms. This was partly 
the result of a genuine belief in the equipotentiality principle 
(Pavlov, 1927) - which regarded all animals as largely 
equivalent in terms of their ability to learn through 
conditioning – but seems also to have resulted from a 
revision of people’s interpretation of the principle of 
parsimony with a greater focus on the simplicity of the 
explanatory rules and less on the need for accord with prior 
knowledge. 
Thus, for the greater part of the 20th century, Morgan’s 
Canon has held sway - and been interpreted to mean that 
animal behaviors should be explained, wherever possible 
using simple, conditioning-based explanations as these were 
judged to be most parsimonious and, thus, best.  
Occam’s Razor and Parsimony  
Parsimony in scientific research is often regarded in terms 
of Occam’s Razor, which literally translates as “entities 
must not be multiplied beyond necessity” but is commonly 
understood to mean that the simplest hypothesis explaining 
an observation is the best (Kneale & Kneale, 1962). 
However, this simple restatement ignores the key phrase in 
the original: “beyond necessity”. Thus, a more complete 
restatement would require that the best explanation be the 
simplest one that accords with our state of knowledge about 
the object or event in question. 
The relevance of this to animal behavior research is that, 
when considering the most parsimonious explanation for an 
animal’s behavior, we must take into account what we 
already know about that species, related species and even 
animals in general. Imagine, for example, if one were to see 
a small animal (of an unfamiliar species) moving along the 
ground and were interested in starting to explain its 
behavioral repertoire. Starting with the very broadest of 
behaviors, for example, we might ask whether the creature’s 
appearance in this location is indicative of its environmental 
predilections and behaviors. 
1798
That is, is the simplest (most parsimonious) explanation 
for its presence that it is a terrestrial creature native to the 
area? The answer, in the absence of additional information 
should, clearly, be yes – this is the simplest explanation that 
explains the limited data we have. It does not require us to 
hypothesize about any alternative modes of movement 
beyond the observed, terrestrial movement nor does it 
require an additional explanation about why a non-native 
creature might be here. 
If, however, while still unfamiliar with the species in 
question, you recognize that it is a type of bird this would, 
almost certainly, change the description judged most 
parsimonious. Given a general knowledge of birds, it would 
seem reasonable to decide, instead, that the most 
parsimonious explanation is that the creature is capable of 
flight and only currently on the ground – as the vast 
majority of birds are capable of flight. To take the example 
a step further, imagine that, in addition to recognizing the 
creature as a bird, you also recognize that it is, in fact, a type 
of penguin. This would cause another revision in the best 
explanation for its behavior (current and potential); in this 
case, concluding that it is, most probably, flightless and 
aquatic - as are all other penguin species. 
Thus, knowledge about related species changes both the 
description of current behavior and expected behavioral 
repertoire of an animal; and, any attempt to find the simplest 
(most parsimonious) explanation for an animal’s behavior 
must incorporate this knowledge. 
Animal Cognition 
Few people, of course, would disagree with the above 
examples and ethologists such as Tinbergen (1951) and 
Lorenz (2002/1949), despite their largely behaviorist view-
points would, doubtless, start any observations of a new 
species with assumptions regarding its behavior based on 
the behavior of known, related species. The behaviors 
described by ethologists and those considered of greatest 
import by those comparative psychologists holding to 
Morgan’s Canon, however, differ in significant ways. For 
the most part, ethologists deal with general types of 
instinctive behavior in the natural environment whereas 
comparative psychology concerns itself with animal 
cognition to gain insight into human cognition. That is, to 
what extent are animals capable of reason, learning and self-
awareness and how can this knowledge be used to better 
understand human behavior?  
As noted above, the behaviorist school of psychology 
(see, e.g., Skinner, 1938) applied Morgan’s Canon 
uniformly and attempted to explain both human and animal 
behavior in terms of conditioned responses as the 
equipotentiality principle argued for all organisms learning 
in, essentially, the same fashion with differences only in the 
speed at which learning occurred. 
The  cognitive revolution, starting in the 1950s, however, 
convinced most psychologists that attempts to explain 
complex, human behaviors such as language use within a 
simple, reinforcement-learning paradigm was infeasible 
(see, e.g., Neisser, 1967). Perhaps the single greatest effect 
of this revolution was to move psychology away from 
regarding the mind as a black box about which nothing 
could be known beyond inputs (stimuli) and outputs 
(observed behaviors). Instead, it was recognized that: firstly, 
the mind cannot be a blank slate prior to learning because a 
blank slate will not react to inputs in any way (for a recent 
summary of the cognitive revolution, see Pinker, 2003); 
and, secondly, that observing the manner in which behaviors 
change as stimuli change allows us to meaningfully 
hypothesize about cognitive structures/processes. 
This recognition of the need to understand an organism’s 
cognitive processes or mind was not restricted to humans, 
however. Breland and Breland (1961) identified instinctive 
drift (the tendency for animals’ trained behaviors to revert to 
the nearest equivalent instinctive behavior) and Garcia and 
Koelling (1966) exposed the difficulties of training animals 
when the conditioned and unconditioned stimuli did not 
‘match’ (e.g., illness could be induced in rats by a flavor but 
not by a light or sound). That is, it was demonstrated that, in 
order to predict and understand experimental results, one 
needs to know not just the stimulus and resultant behavior 
but also the cognitive processes of the organism in question.  
Despite such work, however, the shift from behaviorism 
to cognitive psychology stalled in animal research – no 
doubt partly because access to human cognitions is often as 
easy as asking someone what they are thinking while animal 
minds are much harder to read; but also, it seems, due to a 
continued belief that the most parsimonious explanation are 
those that posit the simplest possible processes without 
reference to ‘human’ cognitive processes (see, e.g., Wynne, 
2007). 
The question, though, how should our understanding of 
parsimony affect our beliefs regarding the best explanations 
for animal behaviors in terms of psychological processes? 
This is discussed in greater detail as regards two central 
areas of animal cognition that have provoked significant 
discussion: animal intelligence and theories of mind. 
Animal Intelligence 
Between Species Differences 
Most people have very little difficulty in believing that 
certain types of animal are more intelligent than others. This 
seems to be one case where our understanding of the 
concept of common lineage has led us to conclude that 
animals more like us are likely to be more intelligent; and 
experimental work has offered some support for this. Work 
by Warren (1977), for example, comparing fish, chickens, 
mice and cats on a learning task returned the expected order 
of results – with the cats performing best, then the mice, the 
chickens and, finally, the fish – although only the cats 
performed significantly better than the other species. 
The problem with such assessments, however, is clear. 
The very differences described by the Brelands (1961) and 
Garcia and Koelling (1966) make cross-species comparisons 
difficult as differences in instinctive behaviors mean that 
certain species learn particular tasks more easily, thus 
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making it difficult to determine whether any differences 
result from differences in “intelligence” or just differential 
degrees of match between a species and the task/apparatus 
being used. 
 
Individual and Strain Differences 
To avoid these problems, most researchers concentrate, 
instead, on within-species analyses as these should eliminate 
most differences in instinctive behavior and allow 
meaningful conclusions to be drawn. However, between 
research into human and animal intelligence lies a vast gulf 
- in the form of differential treatment of individual and 
group differences within a species. 
In human research, individual differences is a major field 
of research, while group differences are very much a 
sideline – a result, Fraser (1995) argues, of the feeling that 
research into group differences in intelligence (in particular) 
is motivated by prejudice. By comparison, animal research 
is dominated by comparisons between strains of the same 
species – with tests of such attributes as spatial ability, 
memory and even reasoning using pigeons (Wilkie & 
Wilson, 1995), mice (Tang, et al., 1999) and rats (Anderson, 
1992), respectively. These often include neuroanatomical 
studies to associate the cognitive differences with particular 
brain structures (the hippocampus, for example, is strongly 
linked to spatial learning by the above studies). 
Individual differences in animals, by comparison, have 
been largely ignored or even dismissed – as by Warren 
(1977), who claimed that there was no evidence of 
individual animals performing above the level of their peers. 
This dismissal, however, seems to be driven, in part at least, 
by adherence to the narrow interpretation of Morgan’s 
Canon described above. That is, individual differences in 
animal intelligence are not discussed because intelligence 
(which is largely understood in terms of studies of 
individual differences in humans) is regarded as a ‘higher’ 
order cognitive process and, therefore, inappropriate to 
apply to animal behavior. 
This position, however, is at odds with both our everyday 
experience – those people who interact with animals on a 
regular basis such as animal trainers and researchers are 
adamant that certain, individual animals are smarter than 
others (see, e.g., Goodall, 1968; Kohler, 1925; Pepperberg, 
1990) – and knowledge available to us from a variety of 
fields, including evolutionary theory and the strain 
differences studies mentioned above. 
The first point, of course, relies on the same anecdotal 
evidence that led to the formulation of Morgan’s Canon and 
runs the risk of the Clever Hans effect (Pfungst, 1911) 
where the trainer’s own unconscious behavior is responsible 
for apparent differences in learning. As such, it must be 
treated with caution. 
The second point, however, argues strongly for there 
being individual differences in animal “intelligence” – 
broadly defined here as any cognitive faculty affecting 
performance on a task. Specifically, according to the theory 
of evolution by natural selection, it is individual, genetic 
differences in traits that cause differential survival and 
(eventually) speciation (Darwin, 1876/1988). As such, if the 
argument is to be made that there are differences between 
the cognitive abilities of different species (for example, that 
humans have better reasoning abilities than other species) 
then these differences must have their origins in individual 
differences within the ancestral populations from which the 
compared species are descended (Griffin, 1976). Thus, in 
the ancestral species from which humans and chimpanzees 
are both descended, there must have been individuals with 
better reasoning abilities than their peers – otherwise these 
reasoning abilities could not be selected for and, thus, 
contribute to the evolution of differences between humans 
and chimpanzees.  
Logically, this argument holds at every point of speciation 
where one believes there is a difference in cognitive abilities 
between current species. While this argument does not, in 
and of itself, make any statement regarding individual 
differences within current species, any attempt to argue that 
individual differences might, no longer, exist in species 
other than our own would seem so unlikely as to strain 
credibility. That is, the claim would have to be that: while, 
at every point in the past, individual differences in cognitive 
ability existed within a wide variety of species, now, for 
unexplained reasons, only one species has such individual 
differences. 
In addition to the argument from parsimony proposed 
above, we also have evidence for individual differences in 
cognitive abilities in the form of our ability to selectively 
breed strains of a species for particular cognitive tasks such 
as maze-solving (Stewart, 1961); and the observation that 
strain differences are known to exist on a variety of tasks 
including those described above. Given the derivation of 
these strains from common, ancestor populations, it seems 
unavoidable to conclude that individual differences in the 
various cognitive abilities discussed do exist and that strain 
differences are just these writ large. 
In addition to these logical arguments, there are also a 
number of studies (see, e.g., Anderson, 1992; Locurto & 
Scanlon, 1998; Welsh, 2002) that have shown individual 
differences in the performance of not just specific tasks but 
also the emergence of factor structures amongst various 
tasks reminiscent of the structure of human intelligence as 
described by Carroll (1993). Specifically, there is some 
evidence for attributes akin to human spatial intelligence 
and memory and learning (Gv and Gy in Carroll’s model). 
Given this, it seems reasonable to argue that, when 
attempting to explain animal behavior, appeals to 
differential levels of cognitive ability between individuals is 
not an ‘unnecessary multiplication of entities’ nor does it 
violate Morgans’s Canon as, given the evidence for 
individual differences in various cognitive abilities, animal 
behavior cannot be fairly described without reference to 
such higher order cognitive constructs. In fact, any 
explanation for an animal’s behavior that excludes this 
knowledge is likely to be overly simplistic rather than 
parsimonious. 
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Animal Theories of Mind 
Another area of argument in which Morgan’s Canon is 
frequently applied regards whether animals have a ‘theory 
of mind’. That is, to what extent should animals be regarded 
as possessing minds in the way that humans do; are they self 
aware and aware of the minds of others (Premack & 
Woodruff, 1978)? A number of tests of this are commonly 
used and interpretations of experimental results are often 
hotly debated in terms of whether the behavior of the 
animals in questions indicates a theory of mind or can be 
explained via simple, stimulus-response relationships. 
The goal, herein, is not to attempt to fully restate the 
debate; rather, key aspects of the debate will be considered 
along with findings relating to these and the interpretations 
will be discussed in terms of their parsimony in explaining 
not just the specific behavior at hand but also prior 
knowledge including phylogenetic relationships. 
 
Attention 
One of the preliminary tests for a theory of mind relates to 
whether an organism reacts to another organism’s attention. 
That is, if one animal is looking in a particular direction, 
will the other animal look there as well. This is regarded as 
a test of an organism’s theory of mind as it, theoretically at 
least, requires that the second organism be able to determine 
where the first creature is looking and what it could see 
from there. 
For example, chimpanzees have been shown to 
understand point-of-view – that is, their behavior changes 
according to what an observing creature could see from its 
perspective (Hare, Call, Agnetta, & Tomasello, 2000). 
Further tests of this ability to understand attention have 
included observations of canine communication, where 
dogs’ behaviors are affected by whether they can currently 
be seen by other dogs (Horowitz, 2009) or people (Call, 
Brauer, Kaminski, & Tomasello, 2003). 
These tests of attention, however, are often criticized (in 
terms of their relevance to animal theories of mind) as their 
results can be explained in terms of selective rewards. That 
is, in environments when a human is directly facing them, a 
dog is more likely to have been punished for disobeying a 
command than when a human is facing away. Thus, 
differential learning could occur such that greater obedience 
is observed when the dog-human dyad is in certain spatial 
relations but not in others. This explanation requires only 
simple psychological processes to be hypothesized and, as a 
result, is often claimed to be a more parsimonious 
interpretation of animals’ apparent ability to understand the 
attentional states of others. 
Whether it is, in fact, a simpler explanation, though, is 
questionable. For example, the ability of the dog to 
distinguish between the situations when a second creature is 
and is not looking at it – as required by the stimulus-
response explanation – requires the dog to have been in 
sufficient situations like this one to have learnt the 
difference between the various orientations of other 
creatures and their responses to various communication 
methods. That is, it pre-supposes a history of learning for 
which no evidence is presented. 
Further, given that we know that one social mammal 
(humans) definitely has the ability to determine where 
another creature is attending (which assists with social 
communication and cooperative behaviors), should our 
starting assumption be that a species bred from another 
highly sociable mammal (wolves) and further selected for 
its ability to cooperate with humans does or does not have 
the same ability? 
 
Imitation 
Another central theme is theory of mind research is 
imitative behavior. That is, if an organism can observe 
another organism and then imitate the behavior, then this is 
argued to indicate its ability to understand the intentions of 
the first creature. Of course, there are provisos added to this 
simple description. The observer must be able to distinguish 
between accidental and deliberate behaviors and must also 
be able act in an intentional way – that is, the assumption 
must be that the organism’s goal in imitating the behavior is 
to achieve the outcome that they observed the other creature 
achieving – rather than to simply  mimic the action 
(Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993). 
The ever-present difficulties in designing animal 
experiments such that the animal is motivated to do as the 
experimenter intends make such analyses difficult with 
other species – to the extent that Zentall (2006) suggested 
that, given the number of social and non-social learning 
factors that need to be distinguished from imitation, 
inclusion of the recognition of intent might preclude any 
finding of imitation in non-verbal animals (including young 
humans). 
Instead, Zentall (2006) proposes controlling for a list of 
pre-identified non-imitative learning behaviors and then, by 
a process of elimination, calling any learning that still 
occurs “imitative”. Using this looser definition, there are a 
number of studies that compare how often organisms utilize 
a particular method to achieve a specific task – having seen 
conspecifics perform the task in one of the possible ways. 
Such studies, using budgerigars (Dawson & Foss, 1965), 
monkeys (Custance, Whiten, & Bard, 1999) and rats  as 
subjects, show that an animal’s preferred method of 
achieving specific aims varies according to how it has seen 
other animals perform the same task. 
This has been demonstrated most clearly in chimpanzees 
(Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2007) who 
operated a device with their foot when an unencumbered 
human demonstrated its operation in this way but used their 
hands after seeing a human with his hands full operate the 
device with his foot. That is, they seem capable of 
differentiating between cases when the person could and 
could not use their hands and concluding that, when he 
could but didn’t, there must have been a reason for this. 
Once again, we are left with a question to answer: is it 
more likely, given the evidence we have seen from other 
species, that so useful a learning mechanism (bridging the 
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gap between instinctive and self-learnt behaviors, as Zentall, 
2006, notes) is restricted to a single species or that imitative 




Perhaps the best known of the tests for theory of mind are 
those for false beliefs. That is, whether an organism can 
predict the actions of another organism based on the 
differences between their knowledge about a situation. The 
ability to understand false beliefs has proved very difficult 
to demonstrate in animals – in part, no doubt because of the 
required complexity of the task.  
The classic design of such tests is to have an animal 
observe a conspecific observe a reward being hidden and 
then have the first animal observe the reward being moved 
while the second is not watching (see, e.g., Call & 
Tomasello, 1999; Hare, et al., 2000). The behavior of the 
first animal is then used to attempt to determine whether it 
realizes that the second animal’s belief about the location of 
the reward is false.  
The majority of attempts to test animals understanding of 
false beliefs, however, have failed. Chimpanzees and other 
great apes, generally regarded as the most likely of animals 
to share any particular trait with humans, have not shown an 
ability to distinguish between ignorance and false belief 
(Call & Tomasello, 2008). In fact, other than humans aged 5 
and over, only dolphins have shown significant evidence of 
understanding false beliefs (Tschudin, 2006). Thus, false 
beliefs may mark a qualitative difference between human 
and (at least the majority of) animal minds. That said, 
chimpanzees are able to distinguish between another 
animal’s true beliefs and ignorance, indicating some 
understanding of the complexities of other minds(Call & 
Tomasello, 2008).  
Discussion 
There has been a tendency, when considering the results of 
animal experiments to interpret parsimony as applying to 
each, new experiment as if it is independent of all other 
observations. That is, within each experiment, Morgan’s 
Canon is applied and the researchers attempt to explain the 
results in the simplest psychological terms, without 
reference to our pre-existing stores of knowledge from 
previous experiments, related fields, similar organisms and 
so forth. It is like a physicist who, rather than attempting to 
create universal laws, attempts to explain the results of each, 
individual experiment in the simplest terms without 
reference to the known laws of physics. 
Given the research and argument presented above, it 
seems difficult to conclude that restricting discussion of 
animal behaviors to ‘lower’ level psychological process 
(typically stimulus-reward learning) is an appropriate 
approach. While an explanation of any behavior can be 
attempted in stimulus-reward terms, the adequacy of said 
explanation must be considered. Where such an explanation 
has to posit the existence of a large number of unobserved 
learning trials in a variety of different contexts, and 
alternative explanations exist that accord with our 
knowledge about the behavior of other species and the 
relationships between them, a principled application of 
parsimony would seem to require a reconsideration of 
Morgan’s Canon. 
That is, while recognizing the potential dangers of 
anthropomorphism, it would seem that to adequately explain 
the findings from a variety of animal studies requires the use 
of higher-level psychological concepts such as intelligence 
and an understanding that animals are likely to have at least 
a limited theory of mind. In short, we need to consider 
animal behavior from a more cognitive view-point. 
Future Research 
An acceptance that animal behavior can meaningfully be 
discussed in similar, cognitive terms to that of humans 
opens up a range of research opportunities. For example, 
advancements in genetics and the mapping of the complete 
genomes of various species allows for the use of synteny 
homology (the fact that portions of one species genome 
have corresponding regions on other species genomes where 
large numbers of genes are found in the same order) would 
allow the use of analyses to investigate the genetic basis of 
cognition. 
That is, those higher-level psychological processes that 
have clear equivalents between humans and animals could 
be isolated using animal genetic models, which have the 
advantage of large litter sizes and short inter-generational 
intervals, and then mapped to the human genome. This 
approach is, in fact, already underway in the medical 
sciences (see, e.g., Tang, et al., 1999) but its acceptance 
within psychology has been limited (for exceptions, see 
Anderson, 1992; Locurto & Scanlon, 1998; Welsh, 2002) 
with the result that those best suited to isolating and 
measuring the cognitive traits of animals have yet to start 
playing a major role. 
Conclusions 
Morgan’s Canon has, over the past century been applied in a 
manner which, while seeming rigorous, has actually reduced 
the parsimony of explanations of animal behavior. Moving 
away from this too-broad application of the Canon, in 
addition to being necessary in order to develop the best and 
most parsimonious explanations of animal behavior, will 
allow animal research to join the cognitive revolution and 
allow comparative, cognitive research which will shed 
further light on human cognition. 
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